@article{oai:konan-wu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000974,
 author = {香川, 豊},
 issue = {43},
 journal = {甲南女子大学研究紀要. 人間科学編, Studies in human sciences},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {110006424954, Appearances, since they are ideas, are thus referred to 'something'. This 'something' is described as the transcendental object. In the Transcendental Deduction, it can only be a correlate to the unity of apperception. The object to which I relate appearances is always the transcendental object. As Kant says, the transcendental object in this sense, can not be separated from sensuous data, and then reduces it, so far as it can be known, to the necessary synthetic unity of the appearances themselves. But the very word 'appearance' implies a reference to 'something' in itself, that is, to an object independent of our sensibility. This at least leaves it an open question whether the transcendental object may not be a thing-in-itself. We must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression of 'something' in itself. It is a problem in this paper.},
 pages = {19--24},
 title = {相関者としての超越論的対象と物自体},
 year = {2007}
}